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Abstract
In this article, we focus attention on a poorly understood aspect of contentious politics: the interaction between the transnational diffusion of new forms of protest behavior and the diffusion of police practices in response to them. Studies of diffusion are usually limited to the diffusion of one kind of innovation by one set of actors to another, as in the diffusion of technical innovations from innovators to adopters. But collective action diffusion also produces a parallel and interactive sequence of "public order"
reactions. Using the transnational counter-summits that emerged around the turn of the century as our source of evidence, we focus on the co-evolution of protester and police innovations across national boundaries. Our major finding is that the mechanisms that cause protester and police innovations to diffuse are remarkably similar: promotion , the proactive intervention by a sender actor aimed at deliberate diffusion of an innovation; assessment, the analysis of information on past events and their definition as successes or failures, which leads to adaption of the innovation to new sites and situations; and theorization, the location of technical innovations within broader normative and cognitive frameworks. We close with a speculative application of our findings to the recent diffusion of protester tactics and regime responses in the Middle East and North Africa.
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I. Interactive diffusion: Three Cases
Seattle. November 1999. At the third ministerial conference of the WTO, called to launch negotiations aimed at increasing market liberalization, a counter-summit is organized by a heterogeneous group of protesters ranging from trade unionists to environmentalists to anarchists.
From the morning of the very first day, on November 30, a series of sitins, coordinated by the Direct Action Network, stops most of the 3000 delegates from 135 countries from reaching the inaugural ceremony. Organized into "affinity groups", only loosely linked with each other, some 10,000 demonstrators sit on the ground tied together in chains using the so-called "lock down" and "tripod" techniques that make removing the blockages more difficult. When the police arrive to clear the streets leading to the summit, the demonstrators make no move to resist but apply the tactics they have learned during courses in non-violence. On the fringes of a massive march called by the AFL-CIO (American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations) small groups turn violent, smashing the windows of shops dealing in multinational products. The police have already stepped in en masse, deploying tear gas and pepper spray. After a curfew is declared, blockages and police charges continue for three days until the intergovernmental summit breaks up with no agreement reached. As many as 600 people are arrested. Seattle's chief of police resigns the week after.
This "Battle of Seattle" is to come under the scrutiny of four commissions of inquiry organized by the American Civil Liberties Union, the Seattle National Lawyers Guild -WTO Legal Group, the Committee for Local Government Accountability and the WTO Accountability Review Committee.
Genoa, July 2001. Another international summit, this time of the G-8 industrialized countries, is met by another counter-summit. The Genoa Social Forum, a coalition of about 800 organization, has worked for more than one year to prepare the protest. Negotiations between them and the local and national authorities have been sporadic and inconclusive. To control the protests, in addition to installing high barriers to protect the so-called 'red zone' around the summit meetings from the protesters, the airport, railway stations and motorway exits are closed, and suspected activists are sent back to the city limits.
During the entire first day of the summit, on July 20 th , protests are staged in different areas, with protesters trying to enter the "red zone" in nonviolent ways. At various points, however, the police respond to the Black Bloc's attacks by setting upon those in or near peaceful protests, including doctors, nurses, paramedics, photographers and journalists. After the police charge against the (non violent and authorized) march of the "Disobedients" , some groups of demonstrators react by throwing stones, provoking the police to use armoured cars.
During one incursion, a carabinieri jeep becomes stuck and its occupants are attacked by demonstrators. One of the carabinieri inside opens fire, killing a 23-year-old Genoese activist, Carlo Giuliani. Within the red zone, the police use water cannon laced with chemicals against demonstrators from the transnational social movement organization ATTAC, left-wing and trade union groups, who have been banging on the fences and throwing cloves of garlic.
On the evening of 21 July, after various police charges during a peaceful march of about two hundred thousand, the police burst into the DiazPertini School, where the GSF, its legal advice team, the Indymedia press group and a dormitory for protestors are based, searching for weapons and Black Bloc activists. Here as elsewhere, the behaviour of the police is particularly brutal.
In the days that follow, various testimonies are published recounting civilians' mistreatment in the Bolzaneto barracks, where a centre for identifying detainees had been set up. Many of these statements, a large number of them from foreigners, describe physical and psychological assaults.
The final balance includes about 1,000 demonstrators wounded (328 sent to hospital) (della Porta et al 2006, 3-6) . A parliamentary investigative committee is established, and three major trials are held, one of them bringing about the incrimination of high-ranking policemen.
Evian May-June 2003. The annual G8 summit takes place in a small French-speaking town on the Geneva lakeside, Evian. As protests are announced, from May 28th until 3rd June 2003, Evian is surrounded by a broad no-go zone, while protests develop in nearby Geneva as well as on the other side of the border, in France. During the summits, thousands of activists gather in a conferences, meet, and march. Alternative villages are self-organized and self-managed as experiments in anti-capitalist life. A Third-World Debt Court involves celebrities and sit-ins. Street performances and road blockades are staged both on the Swiss and the French sides.
On June 3 rd 100 000 people are involved in two marches (from France to Switzerland and vice versa) that meet at a checkpoint left unattended by the authorities. Violent confrontations also develop between the police and the demonstrators. Two activists suspend themselves from the Aubonne bridge, with a rope stretching across the bridge, halting traffic. The police cut the rope: one of the protestors, Briton Martin Shaw, plunges into a rocky river, suffering multiple fractures. The police will be put on trial but acquitted as, according to the judges, their actions were based on "a series of unfortunate misunderstandings".
In these accounts of three protest episodes and their policing we find two main departures from past practices:
• First, the contestation of international summits through the use of diverse forms of protest, including a variety of forms of direct action;
• Second, the development of specific strategies for the policing of transnational protest, based upon the isolation of the official summit and aggressive forms of coercion of demonstration rights (della Porta,
Peterson and Reiter 2006).
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Although there were some differences in the development of these events that reflect deep-rooted national traditions, underlying them was a family resemblance between protester and police behavior in these three episodes, and something else as well: protestors' and police repertoires spread transnationally.
There was, as the title of our paper suggests, a process of "interactive diffusion."
In recent years there has been a remarkable convergence in the social sciences on a process that many had acknowledged but few had studied systematically: the transnational diffusion of collective phenomena. Beth A.
Simmons and her collaborators survey this development in a number of fields:
Anthropologists…laid primary emphasis on diffusion, that is, the process of adopting or borrowing by one culture from aother various devices, implements, institutions and beliefs. More recently, sociologists have argued that nations mimic their successful peers almost ritualistically. Economists debate whether there is a rational/material base to international financial crises. Or whether they result from "contagious" herd behavior. Political scientists have incorporated the diffusion of ideas into their accounts of the choice of economic policies. Students of organizational behavior model international networks among people and firms that are said to drive the diffusion of technology and management practices (Simmons et al. 2006:789) .
Social scientists' interest in diffusion dates to three decades ago, when Everett Rogers called attention to the diffusion of technological innovation (1983) . Diffusion, Rogers showed, generally follows an "S-shaped curve", first beginning with an innovation that is hesitantly accepted by a few adopters; followed by a rapid expansion to a large number of adopters; and leveling off at or near the capacity of a given population to absorb it. While Rogers' findings were replicated for a number of politicallyrelevant phenomena -for example, the diffusion of welfare policies between the American states (Soule and Zylan 1997) --for some time, political scientists had little to say about the diffusion of collective action. That was, in part, because a single-minded structuralism that focused attention on the economic and social preconditions of change, rather than on its processes (Elkins and Simmons 2005: 34) ; in part because diffusion and its constituent mechanisms seemed to fit badly with dominant correlational strategies of analysis; and, in part, because processes like democratization, social movement mobilization, and economic modernization were studied in largely domestic terms. These studies tended "to reduce 'external influences' to simple exogenous factors" (Simmons et al. 2006) .
But sometime around the turn of the century, students of various collective phenomena, from economic liberalization, to democratization, and to various forms of contentious politics, began to attend seriously to the diffusion processes they observed around them. First in "third wave" democratization, then in the diffusion of Keynesianism and neo-liberal doctrines, then through the collapse of state socialist regimes at the beginning of the 1990s, and finally in the so-called "color revolutions" of the turn of the century, social scientists began study the patterns they saw in the diffusion of collective phenomena.
2 The latest episode, to which we will briefly turn in our conclusions, is the rapid diffusion of revolutionary insurgency across the Middle East and North Africa in the first half of 2011.
Three ambiguities limited the capacity of these studies to grasp both the complexities and the overall patterns of diffusion of these collective phenomena:
First, while diffusion is normally defined as a process, "a principal source of confusion…concerns its use as both outcome and process" (Elkins and Simmons 2005:36) . Second, studies of the spread of technical innovations did not take scholars very far towards an understanding of the differential implementation of the innovation studied. Farmers might be faster or slower in adopting hybrid corn seeds, but there were few signs of collective processes within farm communities that either helped or hindered the innovation's adoption.
Not so the diffusion of collective phenomena. 4 Third, diffusion studies tracked shifts between an innovator and an adopter in the absence of significant third parties whose reactions might also diffuse. In the case of revolution or democratization, they could be states which opposed these shifts (Soule and Tarrow 1991) ; in the case of social movement diffusion, the police or counter-movements. Few studies of contentious politics linked the diffusion of new social movements to the coevolution of opposing forces.
I Some Preliminaries
The study of such reciprocal patterns of diffusion began in 1983, when Doug
McAdam published his now-classical article, " Tactical and the responses of both southern elites and police forces to these changes.
McAdam's model to explain the pace of insurgency can be simply stated. He writes:
Barring the attainment of significant institutionalized power, then, the pace of insurgency comes to be crucially influenced by (a) the creativity of insurgents in devising new tactical forms, and (b) the ability of opponents to neutralize these moves through effective tactical counters (p. 736).
These two broad processes McAdam described, respectively, as tactical innovation and tactical adaptation. Together they concatenated in the larger process of tactical interaction, "in which insurgents and opponents seek, in chess-like fashion, to offset the moves of the other. How well each succeeds at this task crucially affects the pace and outcome of insurgency" (ibid.). However, Oliver and Myers's work remained at the level of general theory; they did not try to specify the mechanisms that explain the co-evolution of protester and police practices. In this paper, we will attempt such a double specification by studying transnational diffusion of counter-summits, which developed in Western
Europe and the United States in the late 1990s, and of police practices in response to them.
We began in the incipit with three stages in the evolution of the countersummit against the Seattle, Genoa and Evian summits between 1999 and 2003. We will now turn in Part Two to a brief analysis of the evolving protest performances observed at counter-summits, using the three events as our main data points. In
Part Three, we turn to the mechanisms of diffusion that we observed among protestors in these events. In Parts Four and Five, we examine police practices that developed in response to these innovations and how these practices diffused.
Finally, in Part Six, we suggest how reciprocal adaptation through competition occurred between police forces and transnational protesters during this period. We are interested in identifying the causal mechanisms within the diffusion of transnational counter-protests and the diffusion of the police practices in response to them.
First some definitions:
Transnational protests we define as protests that mainly address international targets and involve a substantive number of protesters from different countries (della Porta and Tarrow 2005) .
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Diffusion we define, with Strang, as when "prior adoption of a trait or practice in a population alters the probability of adoption for remaining non-adopters" (Strang 1991:325) .
Causal mechanisms we define, with Gerring, as "the pathway or process by which an effect is produced or a purpose is accomplished" (Gerring 2007, 178) . We are not the first to attempt to specify the mechanisms of transnational diffusion. In their research on the "global diffusion" of international norms, Simmons and her collaborators (2006) singled out four main mechanisms: a) coercion, through manipulation of opportunities and constraints by powerful countries; b) competition, as a, more decentralized, adaptation c) learning, which "refers to a change in beliefs or change in one's confidence in existing beliefs, which can result from exposure to new evidence, theories or behavioral repertoires" (ibid.: 795);
Simple learning leads to changes on means, complex learning includes changes in aims as well.
d) emulation, which is based on adhesion to shared global norms (i.e., appropriateness) propagated by experts and/or identified peers.
In our cases, coercion has a low impact as, even in the spread of police repertoires, public order remains mainly a domestic policy area. Competition is also of little relevance, as, within each camp states and movements of different countries cooperated in their respective aims. Learning (often linked with emulation) we will find to be an important form of diffusion (Givan, Roberts and Soule 2010, 9) . But learning is a composite mechanism: we find that it works through the mechanisms we define as promotion, assessment, and theorization . Beyond the diffusion of police and movement tactics, we found a reciprocal diffusion between protesters and police forces, which, among them, constituted a kind of interactive dance between protesters and police forces.:
• By promotion , we mean the proactive intervention by a sender actor aimed at deliberate diffusion of an innovation;
• By assessment, we mean the analysis of information on past events and their definition as successes or failures, which leads to adaption of the innovation to new sites and situations;
• By theorization , we mean the location of technical innovation within broader normative and cognitive framework (Strang and Meyer 1993) , a mechanisms also facilitates by experts (Simmons, et al., 35 ff.) .
Empirically, we will use illustratively data from the three transnational protest campaigns sketched above and police responses to them to show how these sets of mechanisms co-evolved between protester and police actions. The similarities and dynamics we find in these these events suggest the need to consider each episode as part of a (shorter or longer) interactive chain: none can be considered as an independent unit (for a similar methodological observation, see Schmitter 2009).
II. The New Protest Repertoire: What Diffused?
We first examine the general counter-summit strategy as it developed in the late 1990s and the early part of the new century and then turn to the variety of distinct performances found within it.
The Counter-summit Strategy
Counter-summits are broad combinations of different protest performances held during official summits -mainly at the site of these summits --and on the same issues but from a critical standpoint, heightening awareness through protest and information with or without contact with the official actors (Pianta 2001) . The form first emerged in the 1980s in rather contained form, but was given a more contentious face in the 1990s as the doctrine of global neoliberalism took hold. Between the mid-1990s and the years following the turn of the century, the number of these events continued to increase (see Figure 1, reproduced from the work of Pianta and Marchetti,2007) .
Figure 1 about here
Counter-summits began back in the 1980s, including mass demonstrations against some international institutions, but also in conference-like meetings during UN summits on women's rights, human rights or environmental protection.The early counter-summits mainly took the form of conferences on the borders of official summits; only later did they evolve into complex, multiform protest episodes. 7 The introduction of non-violent direct action was a strategic innovation, adopted in response to the scant success of previous, more moderate tactics. While at subsequent counter-summits, both networking and the spread of alternative knowledge through public spaces for discussion were important, and the "logic of numbers" continued to play a role, non-violent direct action was added as an instrument that increased the disruptive capacity (and media value) of the protest.
The underlying objective of the protesters in the counter-summit strategy was to enter the "red zones" where the delegates worked during the summit.
This was usually done through non-violent direct action. Crucial was the symbolic value of disrupting the summit, and so denying the legitimacy of IGOs and highlighting their isolation by forcing them into fortress-like enclaves. In the words of the prominent activist Naomi Klein, "Confrontations are staged at the fence-but not only the ones involving sticks and bricks: tear-gas canisters have been flicked back with hockey sticks, water cannon have been irreverently challenged with toy water pistols and buzzing helicopters, mocked with swarms of paper airplanes" (Klein 2002, XXV) .
Broadly understood, the counter-summit strategy includes variations on two traditional protest forms: the march and the assembly. Even though these are well-known modular forms of protest, their "arrangements" (to extend the musical metaphor) developed in new directions. In general, the marches typically consist of different actions: protestors marched, but they also ran, danced, jumped, played, sang, shouted, preyed, caried banners and distributed leaflets. Non violent direct action by affinity groups: small activist groups that make decisions and act as a unit within street protests, sometimes linking their actions to other affinity groups through 'spokesperson' meetings;
Masked street formations by the Black Blocs: that involve masked protesters wearing black clothing and moving in tight formation.
Blockading: stopping movement along a particular road." Wood identifies two variants: "soft blocs", which involve protesters holding on to one another and "hard blocs," in which they are locked to one another.
Jail solidarity: "noncooperating techniques which protesters use after arrest, such as refusing to identify oneself to the police". Protest puppetry: "the use of giant puppets to visually portray the issue to by-standers, the media and others" (Wood 2007: 377-8) .
With some variations, many of these "Seattle" performances were adopted and adapted in the Genoa events, including:
Breaking into the area of the summits, using various (more or less) symbolic techniques. This involved "pushing and shoving" the police, who patrolled the borders of the No-go areas.
Marches, oriented to show the force of the numbers, were integrated into the program of the counter-summit. On the last day of the Genoa countersummit, a large common march was meant to show "unity in diversity".
Spaces for debate, used to develop alternatives and facilitate networking.
Here as well, the different movement sectors had separate spaces in which to build on their affinities, as well as common spaces, designed to increase reciprocal understanding.
Social disobedience: theorized by the "Laboratorio della disobbedienza sociale"; 9 it included the use of theatrical performances and the wearing of shields and other defensive means resembling the armor of medieval warriors.
Sit-ins. The nonviolent wing (led by Rete Lilliput, a large coalition of NGOs and social movement organizations active on issues of peace, human rights and environmental protection) staged sit-ins as well as "peaceful interposition", sitting with their hands in the air, painted in white, between the police and more violence-oriented demonstrators.
Encampments. Responding to the police success in keeping the demonstrators away from the summit scene, some of the protesters at the next anti-G8 counter-summits in Evian constructed counter-villages, which were designed as free spaces (or Temporary Liberated Zones) where capitalism and liberalism -together with racism and sexism-were contested in the everyday life of the camp.
Having established some characteristics of the repertoire of the countersummit, we now turn to how the new protest repertoire diffused across borders and over time.
III. How the New Repertoire Diffused
Previous research on diffusion has stressed the importance of both indirect and direct channels in the adoption of specific tactics, such as the sit-in (McAdam and Rucht 1993) . The symbolic construction of similarities between the conditions of the senders and those of the receivers has been considered as a precondition for diffusion (Strang and Meyer 1993) . And diffusion has been seen mainly as adaptation of tactics by an active adopter rather than accommodation to ideas produced by an active transmitter.
Some of these assumptions are confirmed if we look at the spread of the counter-summit repertoire. We describe below three mechanisms that we see operating in this process of diffusion through learning and emulation: promotion, assessment and theorization.
Promotion
The deliberate use of direct channels of communication and the strategic promotion of specific performances (such as particular theatrical performances, or the "nonviolent interpositions") seem to be more relevant for the countersummits of the early 2000s than for the sit-ins of the 1960s. While the Internet helped to spread some of these innovations through indirect channels, they were also promoted through transnational training sessions in nonviolent protest. continue to disrupt these international events," one activist argued, "we have to change tactics" (ibid., 435).
Theorization
In their landmark article on diffusion (1993), Strang and Meyer pointed out that diffusion models often abstract from specific practices to theorize a kind of "folk wisdom" that can travel more readily than more specific practices. Thus, for example, the diffusion of the Gandhian nonviolent repertoire from India to the United States' civil rights movement took place through a theorization of its major properties, leaving many of the specific practices Gandhi had used behind (Chabot 2002) . One striking aspect of the transnational network that developed after Seattle was the rapidity with which advocate/scholars/publicists theorized the forms of action and organization employed at different counter-summits.
Theorization was visible in the adaptation of the tactic of "social disobedience" by the White Overalls (Tute Bianche, later to be known as the 
IV. Protest Policing: What Diffused?
Counter-summits have been met with growing police concern, and by a new strategy of protest policing, including internationalization, militarization and the moves to specific forms of escalation of force. Table 2 The transnational coordination of police units combined with the militarization of public order, even in countries, such as Great Britain, which was once considered a prime example of "citizen policing" (Waddington 1993 ). This militarization, including equipment, training, organization and strategies, first developed in the fight against organized crime, but also against street crime and football hooliganism, and then migrated from there to the control of protest ).
Finally, there has been a shift from the practice of negotiated protest management developed in the 1980s and 1990s to escalated protest control. The coercive strategies that developed from Seattle to Genoa and beyond recall the "escalated force" style of the past, but with adaptations to respond to the new protest repertoires, police frames, and technologies (della Porta and Reiter 2006; Vitale 2005 ). In a cross-event comparison, the police style in the control of transnational was summarized as follows:
There was indeed a return to the massive use of force, especially oriented at temporary incapacitation, with protestors forced to the margins. Negotiations took place, but trust between the negotiators remained low, also because of the uncompromising messages sent by the police with other interventions aimed at protection and prevention during the period leading up to the demonstrations. Finally, there were clear attempts at 'intelligence-led', with much emphasis given to massive collection and frequent exchange of information" (della Porta and Reiter 2006, 182) .
A massive police presence with high visibility was found at numerous transnational protest events in both North America and Europe. In most of the cases examined in the comparative research of (della Porta, Reiter and Peterson 2006) , police officers donned heavy anti-riot gear and, above all, special units were deployed for coercive intervention against "troublemakers". The army, as well as paramilitary bodies , such as SWAT teams in the U.S., often intervened (Fernandez 2008) .
Various types of "less-lethal" arms were also used against demonstrators, from those traditionally deployed by police public order units, ranging from tear gas and/or water cannon to newer developments like hand-held irritating sprays and rubber and plastic bullets. The results were predictable: in Gothenberg, three demonstrators were wounded, in Genoa one demonstrator was killed, and in Seattle, Windsor and Gothenburg, groups of demonstrators were encircled by police and kept penned in for long periods. Mass arrests, sometimes made far from the demonstration venue, and often reversed by the courts, were made in Seattle, Washington, Prague, Quebec City, Gothenburg and Genoa.
Deterrence of demonstrators-both in general and in specific areas-is a main strategic goal of authorities in the policing of transnational protest events (Fernandez 2008: 86) . After a geographical location is selected for the summit, Legal provisions (from city regulations to national codes) against vandalism, trespassing, failure to disperse, disobeying a lawful order, but also traffic laws, and laws on use of fire in public are frequently arrayed to repress protesters. In fact, "Temporary ordinances, creative use of old laws, and legal permits are now common ways to control the protest" (Fernandez 2008: 166) . In the United
States, before the summit of the World Economic Forum, the NYC police department called for zero tolerance against violent protesters, implementing arrests against anyone interfering with traffic (using an edict of 1845 prohibiting 3 or more people from assembling in a public space wearing masks). In the same vein, fire regulations and public health ordinances were applied to prevent the preparation of protest. Protest permits are also used to reduce the movements of protesters and restrict them to inconvenient areas. The housing of demonstrators has also been actively obstructed (as e.g. in Calgary, where the authorities refused to host protesters, and out-bid an offer by the protesters to lease land from the Stoney First Nation; Fernandez 2008, 87) .
V. How the New Police Repertoire Diffused
The transnational spread of police techniques was also diffused by a set of causal mechanisms which parallel remarkably the ones we singled out for the diffusion of protestor tactics. instructing and training police forces in updated techniques of civil disobedience management (Fernandez 2008: 98) . In the EU, the European Police College has been charged with offering targeted training on public disturbances.
Promotion
Assessment
After the perceived failure in Seattle, police forces engaged in extensive planning to control future counter-summits. This included the collection of information on the protesters (who they are, how numerous they are, who are the organized groups) as well as a critical elaboration of the lessons learned from the policing of previous transnational events. In the US, information collected from open sources as well as from infiltration (with police power increased by the U.S. PATRIOT ACT) were used to train officers (Fernandez 2008: 109) .
Previous experiences, both successes and failures, became benchmarks for critical assessment. If the protesters were responding to critiques from the inside so were the police. The Seattle case was considered as a failure in law-and-order control, and linked to the lack of preparation of the police that allowed the protestors to "surprise" the police and block the summit. Learning from that, police forces began to invest more effort in the preparation of their intervention.
Heavy criticism emerged also in Gothenburg, where the usually civilized Swedish police were accused by the media and other observers of having lost control, engaging in a sort of police riot (Peterson 2006 ).
The EU Council for Justice and Home Affairs on July 2001 established a Police
Chiefs' Task Force made of police intelligence officers and national contact points with the tasks of collection, analysis and exchange of information on persons and groups that are likely to pose a threat to public order and security on the occasion of transnational protest events. This Task Force had to help the member states that were hosting international summits, by advice and monitoring. Additionally, it had to develop analysis of violent disturbances (Reiter and Fillieule 2006, 159) .
Theorization
The diffusion of police strategies also spread through theorization. The literature on transnational policing has underlined the significance of technical innovation and the influence of advanced surveillance, information processing and communications technologies on the organization of policing. New terms such as "strategic", "pro-active", and "intelligence-led" policing imply approaches for targeting suspect populations and individuals in a highly systematic way. This is applied at the national and transnational levels. In the European case, the European Police College-established by a Council Decision of December 2000-states in its webpage that it aims (among others) at reflecting on the challenges coming from counter-summits such as in Gothenburg and Genoa.
Innovative performances were often legitimized by the extension of a police theory from one sector of policing to another. For example, the practices that the European police evolved in dealing with gangs and soccer hooligans have sometimes been extended to protesters, through the theorization of underlying similarity between gangs and soccer hooligans and protesters. Police tactics for the control of protest follow some general conceptions of the role of the police. For example, Noakes and Gillham (2006) underline the importance of shifts in the dominant visions of the causes of crime and in the corresponding conceptual principles underlying police intervention for protest policing, in particular the implications of the "new penology" with its emphasis on protection and risk management. Zero tolerance doctrines, as well as militaristic training and equipment, are imported into the field of protest policing from other forms of public order control addressing micro-criminality or football hooliganism.
The elaboration of a "penal law of the enemy" is another case in point.
The strategy of space fortification reflects a conception of prevention as isolation from the danger (and the dangerous ones), though a reduction of rights (of demonstrations, movement, privacy) of those citizens that are considered as potential enemies. The assumption is here that "the implementation of the rights as well as the security of the included pass necessarily through the exemption from those rights of the excluded, that is those who do not deserve them, who are marginals …." (Pepino 2006, 262) . This emergency right deviates from the principles or universal rights, instituting a dichotomy between citizens and enemy: in the control of the protest the political rights of the citizens are subordinated to the security of certain groups. of people rather than against specific crimes. Militarization is therefore justified by "states of exception" that foresee the use of the army. In addition, the penal code shifted from punishing specific conduits into the definition of entire categories of people as dangerous for law and order (Pepino 2005: 550) ,
VI. Interactive Diffusion
Given the parallels in the mechanisms of diffusion we observed within each major actor, it is not surprising that we found evidence of reciprocal adaptation between police and protesters -what Oliver and Myers called "coevolution and what we call "interactive diffusion". In the competition for control of public opinion, both police and protesters adapted their moves to the perceived or expected behavior of the other party, based on the experience of previous summits.
In the first place, as we have seen, the police adapted their strategies to each move by the demonstrators. As the cycle of global justice protests evolved, not only were summits protected by larger and larger no-go areas, but they were often located in distant places as well as in non-democratic countries where protesters would find it difficult to travel and organize (on the WTO summits and counter-summits, see Silva 2008) . Secondly, as activists were observed and taken into custody, police files on were built, exchanged with other police across borders, and updated, in order to reduce the possibility for cosmopolitan activists to travel to new venues to stage protests.
Third, police forces also reacted to the perceived delegitimation that aggressive repression brought about with greater violence.
There were connections between police responses to the protests and future police practice. For example, after the killing of a protester and the brutalization of many more at the anti-G8 protests in Genoa, public outrage 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have tried to extend the insights and the research tradition on the interactive diffusion of protesters' and police repertoires begun What is new and different about the cases we studied is that, while
McAdam's actors were learning within a single national political community, ours were learning and diffusing techniques of protest and policing across national boundaries. In a general sense, such transnational diffusion can be seen as evidence of the globalization of the communications media; but, more concretely, it is evidence of the growth of transnational ties, both among governing elites (Slaughter 2004) , and among transnational activists (della Porta and Tarrow 2005) . This suggests a process that is more strategic and more collective than the "bounded rationality" that Kurt Weyland found in the diffusion of previous cycles of contention (Weyland 2009 From evidence from the electoral revolutions in Southeastern Europe and Central Asia, there is the expectation that the geography of the intra-regional diffusion of protest against authoritarian leaders will be contained as a consequence of the radical nature of the project, the mistaken assumption among many oppositional groups as the wave continues that emulation does not require dress rehearsal, hard work or planning and the formidable resources authoritarian leaders command, in part because of the lessons they have culled by watching dictators fall in other countries" (Bunce 2011, 39-40) .
Here as well, the study of interactive diffusion can help understanding the dynamics of the new wave of protests for freedom and their fate. 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 8 In the most recent evolution, following the "street party" performances of the "reclaim the street" movement, a concert or a sort of choral speech (with dozens of short testimonies) has taken the place of the traditional closing speech by movement leaders, and leaf-letting is partially displaced by street theater.
9 A network of squatter social centers from the North and Northeastern Italian regions, that had de-radicalized their forms of action that had develop particular forms of direct action that, while not excluding violent confrontation with the police, tended however to deemphasize physical confrontation in favor of more theatrical forms (Iglesias Turrion 2008).
